EPICTETUS. DISCOURSES. Book ii. §1. ¶1.
Friday
February 24
WHAT is asserted by the philosophers may,
perhaps, appear a paradox to some: let us,
however, examine, as well as we can, whether this
be true: That it is possible in all things to act
at once with caution and courage. For caution
seems, in some measure, contrary to courage;
and contraries are by no means consistent. The
appearance of a paradox to many, in the present
case, seems to me to arise from something like
this. If, indeed, we assert that courage and
caution are to be used in the same instances,
we should justly be accused of uniting contradictions: but, in the way that we afifirm it, where is
the absurdity? For, if what hath been so often
said, and so often demonstrated, be certain, that
the essence of good and evil consists in the use
of the appearances; and that things independent
on choice are not of the nature either of good
or evil: what paradox do the philosophers assert,
if they say: "Where things are not dependent
on choice, be courageous; where they are, be
cautious?" For in these only, if evil consists in a bad choice, is caution to be used.
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